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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Action by father who had legitimated a child born out
of wedlock to obtain visitation rights after the mother, who
had custody of the child, had cut off visitation and denied
him access to the child.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Court found that plaintiff legitimated the child,
Corey Leon Slade, pursuant to 78-30-12 U.C.A.

(1953); acknowledged

the child as his own son, and received him into his family and
treated him as a legitimate child.

The Court awarded plaintiff

visitation rights with the child, Corey; and ordered plaintiff
to pay support of $150.00 per month, commencing August, 1977.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Respondent feels that the statement of

fa~ts

as outlined by Defendant-Appellant, is integrated with argument
and needs to be clarified and amplified to reflect the following
important and undisputed facts.
The child, Corey Leon Slade, was born March 20, 1974.
Plaintiff's paternity of the child has never been disputed by
either party.

(T. 188)

Plaintiff signed a Declaration of
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Paternity prior to the birth of the child, on or about
March 5, 1975, which document was admitted into evidence
as Exhibit 2-P.

(T. 189-190)

ti~

Plaintiff was present at the

of the birth of the child and paid all of the expenses of the bn
(T. 219-220)

The Declaration of Paternity (Exhibit 2-P) was

signed by plaintiff with the express intention of recognizing
Corey as his child.

(T. 224). The child has always carried

the name of plaintiff since his birth, the name of Slade.

(T. 21

After the birth of the child, plaintiff continued to pay
medical expenses for the child (T. 228); placed the child on
his medical insurance policy with his employer, and provided
the child's mother with a card (T. 223); and assisted with
the support of the child, both with the payment of money and
purchase of clothing.

(T.220-221, 223, and 228)

Further,

plaintiff made the child a beneficiary under a life insurance
policy in the sum of $10,000.00.

(T. 239)

Plaintiff continued his relationship with the child's
mother until after the child's second birthday when they
"drifted apart", and plaintiff reunited with his former wife.
(T. 226)

Mr. Slade saw the child on frequent occasions from

his birth until defendant married Mr. Dennis on May 15, 1976.
(T. 224-226)

It was at that time, Mrs. Dennis, the defendant,

refused to let plaintiff see the child as he had in the first
twenty-seven months of the child's life.

(T. 226)

Defendant-
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Appellant asserts that Mr. Dennis, the defendant's husband,
while living with her without the benefit of marriage,
developed a relationship with the child, Corey.

(6 months)

(T. 247)

From the time Corey was two weeks old, plaintiff took
the child into his family and treated the child as if it were
a legitimate child.

The child was taken to Mr. Slade's parents'

home on many occasions by the.plaintiff.

(T. 192-193, 197)

Corey's first birthday was celebrated by both the families
of plaintiff and defendant at defendant's home.

(T. 193)

Corey's second and third birthdays, as well as Christmas and
other holidays were celebrated at the
parents.

(T. 194)

home of Mr. Slade's

Photographs were taken of these special

occasions, as well as others, by plaintiff and his family, which
were introduced into evidence.

(T. 195)

Corey referred to the

plaintiff as "Daddy" until his third birthday.

(T. 199, 205)

The sister of plaintiff, Connie Slade Anderson, and her children,
Corey's cousins, were present on many occasions when Corey was
with plaintiff at his parents' home.

(T. 204-205)

A close

relationship was established between Corey and his cousins during
this period of time.

(T. 205)

Plaintiff's family planned

activities, celebration of holidays, and other special occasions
around Corey "as a member of the family" so that Corey would be
present and take part as a member of the family.

(T.206)
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Plaintiff took Corey in the company of friends and other
acquaintances, and held him out publicly as his son.

(T. 212-21 1

There never was a time from the birth of Corey that the
plaintiff did not regard him as his legitimate child.

(T. 248)

Appellant makes issue of the fact that plaintiff never
asked her to marry him.
diamond ring as a step

However, he did present her with a
toward~matrimony

at approximately the

time that their relationship "drifted apart".

(T. 239)

Defendant-Appellant also makes issue of the fact that she
resided with the child, Corey, in circumstances characterized
by her in her brief as "poverty-level lodging".

It is worthy

to note that from the time that Mr. Slade first met Mrs. Dennis,
February 22, 1973 (T. 242), she resided in the place that she
characterizes as "poverty-level lodging", with her sister,
(Patricia Ann Sanchez) prior to the birth of the child, and
for approximately one year after the birth of the child.

(T.

148)

Plaintiff was placed in the position of having to request
the aid of the Court in regaining visitation with Corey after
Mrs. Dennis had refused him access to the child.

Judge Conder

granted temporary visitation with the child, Corey, to plaintiff,
pending hearing of Plaintiff's Complaint on the merits.
Pursuant to the Order of Judge Conder, Plaintiff was required W
pick up the child and return the child at Defendant's mother's~
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(R. 22-23)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FACTS PRESENTED BY THE EVIDENCE OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORT THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT
THAT PLAINTIFF LEGITIMATED THE CHILD BY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, PURSUANT TO SECTION 78-30-12, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953.
The first issue that was before the lower court was
whether plaintiff-respondent had legitimized his child,
Corey Leon Slade, under the provisions of Section 78-30-12,
Utah Code Annotated,

(1953).

This section of our law sets

out specifically what must be done to legitimize a child and
reads as follows:
The father of an illegitimate child, by
publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it
as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is
married, into his family, and otherwise treating
it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts
it as such, and such child is thereupon deemed for
all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth.
Judge Winder, after hearing all of the evidence presented
by the parties, including various memorandums, in his memorandum
decision of August 1, 1977 (R. 91-92) found that plaintiffrespondent legitimated the child, Corey Leon Slade, by acknowledgement under the above cited statute.

In so finding,

Judge Winder stated:
"The Court finds that the plaintiff legitimated
the child, Corey Leon Slade, by acknowledgement pursuant
to 78-30-12 U.C.A. (1953), including that plaintiff
received Corey as plaintiff's own and into plaintiff's
family and that plaintiff had treated Corey as a
legitimate child."
(Emphasis added)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding -5for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It was established from the evidence presented as an
undisputed fact, that the paternity of the child has never
been disputed by either party.

That plaintiff signed I

(T. 188)

a Declaration of Paternity prior to the birth of the child,
on or about March 5, 1975, which document was admitted into
evidence as Exhibit 2-P.

(T. 189-190)

The Declaration of

Paternity was signed by plaintiff with the express intention
of recognizing Corey as his child.

(T. 224)

The child had

always carried the name of plaintiff since his birth, the
name of Slade.

(T. 219)

That plaintiff had a continual rela-

tionship with the child since its birth, up until the time that
defendant married and then refused to let plaintiff see the
child as he had been allowed to do in the first twenty-seven
months of the child's life.

(T. 224-226)

From the time Corey

was two weeks old, plaintiff took the child into his family and
treated the child as if it were a legitimate child.
197)

(T. 192-19:1

A close relationship was established between the child,

I

Corey, plaintiff's parents, his sister and his sister's children, 1
Corey's cousins.

(T. 193-195, 204-205)

Corey became a member

of plaintiff's family which consisted of the plaintiff, his
parents, his sisters and Corey's cousins.

(T. 206)

Plaintiff

took Corey in the company of his friends and other acquaintances,
and held him out publicly as his son.

(T. 212-215)

There

never was a time from the birth of Corey that the plaintiff did
not regard him as his legitimate child.

(T. 248)

From these

cited facts, it is clear that the plaintiff complied with the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

provisions of the statute by (1)
child as his own, and (2)

publicly acknowledging the

receiving it as such into his

family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate
child.
Defendant-appellant takes issue with the term "family".
The meaning of the term "family" is not confined strictly to
a collection of people under one roof, with one head.

See

generally, 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Sec. 54, 33 ALR 2d 745
Sec. 20.

A family within the contemplation of the statute

may be maintained by a single man who has a settled place of
habitation of which he is the head.
Cal. 534, 108 P. 499.

Re Grids Estate, 157

Receiving into the family implies an

actual and physical acceptance of the child into such place.
Where no home exists, the child may be received into the
father's family within the meaning of the statute.

Courts have

recognized a constructive reception into a family, as a public
and proud acknowledgement of paternity.

Darwin v. Granger,

174 Cal. App. 2d 63, 344 P.2d 353; see also, 10 Am Jur. 2d,
Bastard, Sec. 55.

In this case, plaintiff's family consisted

of the plaintiff, his parents, his sisters, and Corey's cousins.
It was clearly established from the evidence to the satisfaction
of the lower court, that Corey Leon Slade had been accepted
into the plaintiff's family as it existed within the meaning
of the statute, and therefore, the requirements of the statute
had been fully met by plaintiff and the child was deemed, for
-7-
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all purposes, legitimate from the time of its birth.

The

judgment and finding of the lower court that Corey Leon Slade
was legitimate from his birth should be affirmed where it is
clearly and substantially supported by the evidence in this
case.

Nelson v. Nelson, 30 Utah 2d 80, 513 P.2d 1011, 1973;

Glazier and Sons, Inc. v. Larsen, 26 Utah 2d 429, 491 P.2d 226
(1971).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING PLAINTIFF VISITATION RIGHTS WITH HIS
LEGITIMATED SON, COREY LEON SLADE.
The second question confronting the trial court in this
case was may a putative father be awarded the privilege of
visiting his illegitimate child who was in the custody of
the mother?

Courts, in relation to present day society, have

recognized some degree of rights in the acknowledged father of
a child born out of wedlock.

In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.

645 (1971), the Court in striking down as violative of the due
process clause, an Illinois statutory scheme where the father
of an illegitimate child, regardless of whether he had acknowledged the child, was not entitled to notice of hearings
determining whether the child was to be a dependent of the
State, gave recognition to the paternal rights of a putative
father.

The Utah Supreme Court, in State in Interest of "M",

25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970} was faced with an issue
similar to Stanley,

(supra).

The mother of the child faced
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proceedings in the Juvenile Court which sought to deprive her
of parental rights and the father sought to enter the action
and assert his right to custody.
to heRr him.

The Juvenile Court refused

This Court, after first discussing the common-

law background of bastards and sketching the departure from
"filius nullius" of the common law, ruled that a statutory
parent-child relationship existed between the publicly
acknowledged child and his father.

Since the father's duty

of support and education of the child was the same as if it
had been born in wedlock, then it followed that his right
to custody should be "almost as co-extensive."

The Court

ruled that the father was entitled to custody and control
as against all but the mother, if he (1) was competent and
suitable, and (2) it was in the child's best interests.
In Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d
155, 15 ALR 3d 880 (1965), the father, Frank J. Rozanski,
filed a petition to obtain visitation rights with his illegitimate
son.

The facts and circumstances of that case closely parallel

the instant case before the Court.

Mr. Rozanski had established

a relationship with his child and made regular visits with the
child when the mother, in whose custody the child was, refused
to allow him to continue visitations because she had met a man
interested in marrying her who might adopt the child.

The

Court, in granting vistiation rights to Mr. Rozanski, after
considering decisions of other courts confronted with this
problem and the facts and circumstances of this case, clearly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
-9-administered by the Utah State Library.
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recognized that such privileges may be granted.

In rendering

its opinion, the Court stated:
"In each of these cases, the primary concern
of the Court was not the illegitimacy of the child
or the relationship of the parties; the ultimate
decision was based upon the child's welfare."
"We similarly recognize that in any case
involving visitation, neither the fact of illegitimacy
nor the personal preferences or prejudices of the
parents should control our decision. The governing
criterion must always Qe the welfare and best
interests of the child."
"Illegitimacy, however, continues to strike a
discordant and jarring note in our society.
It is
regarded as the fruit of a union of shame, irreverance
and depravity. We have not yet achieved that sophistication or charity which would allow us to understand
and deal with this problem without passion.
Indeed,
our wrath has most often been visited not upon those
who have violated our ethical and moral codes, but,
rather upon the blameless child."

*

*

*

*

"We recognize that granting visitation privileges
to the putative father may not always serve the child's
best interests. Visitation rights, however, are always
a matter for the supervision of the courts. Should it
appear, after visitation privileges have been granted,
that the father's presence has an adverse effect on the
child's welfare, the right to visit may be withdrawn."
(Emphasis added)
"In summary, every case must be decided on
the basis of its own particular facts.
The unique
problems of each child must receive individual
attention and consideration. Any attempt by us to
determine the best interests of every child by a
single rule would be judicially, socially and
morally unsound."
(Emphasis added)
The trial court has broad discretion in deciding questio~
regarding custody and visitation.

It cannot be said under the
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facts and circumstances of this case that the Court abused
its discretion in determining that plaintiff was entitled to
visitation with the minor child, Corey, and that such visitation
was not in the best interests of the child.
The Court, in granting Mr. Rozanski visitation rights,
looked to the facts and circumstances which were as follows:
(a)
Frank J. Rozanski, a married man, and
Evelyn Gwiszcz, a single girl, became the parents
of a baby boy, Bruce, on June 21, 1961.
(b)
The putative father paid the hospital bills
incurred at the time of birth.
(c)
For approximately one year, until he lost his
job, he contributed to the support of the child.
(d)
Mr. Rozanski started divorce proceedings in
order to marry Miss Gwiszcz; however, after several
visits to a priest, they decided not to marry. Subsequently, Mr. Rozanski was reconciled with his wife.
(e)
The putative father testified that his
relationship with the child was excellent. He also
stated that he felt a moral obligation to support and
educate the child as though he were his legitimate son.
(f)
He visited his son on an average of three times
a week. During these visits, he brought clothes and toys
for the boy; took him to the doctor and participated in
various activities with him.
(g)
The child, Bruce, called him "Daddy".
However, differences arose between the mother and
Mr. Rozanski, to the result that arguments resulted in
physical abuse of the mother by Mr. Rozanski.
(h)
Mr. Rozanski was denied access to the boy by
Miss Gwiszcz when she met a young man whom she intended
to marry, not immediately, but in the future. Since
her possible future husband might wish to adopt the
child, she did not want Mr. Rozanski to continue seeing
Bruce.
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(i)
In February, 1964, Mr. Rozanski sought the
aid of the Courts in order to acquire visitation rights.
It is apparent that the facts and circumstances which
existed in the Rozanski case closely parallel those in this
case, with some variations.

In this case, the child took the

name of Mr. Slade as opposed to the mother's name.
were with Mr. Slade's entire family.

VisitatioM

Substantial benefit has

been derived by the visitations in that a close relationship
has developed between Corey and his cousins.
Judge Winder had the opportunity to observe the plaintiff
and appraise his fitness.

He also was in a better position to

determine the weight to be given the testimony of Mrs. Virginia
Husbands, a Certified Clinical Social Worker, called as a witne:;
by the defendant-appellant.

Most of the testimony of Mrs. Husbar

was based upon conjecture and in reliance upon a "perfunctory
reading" of an uncertified transcript of the testimony of the
plaintiff on the morning of the hearing.

(T. 163-165)

Judge Winder ruled that if the reporter filed an affidavit that,
the transcript used by Mrs. Husbands was a true and correct
transcript of the testimony, her opinion based on that transcrirl
may be testified to.

If the affidavit of the reporter was not

filed, any opinion of Mrs. Husbands based upon the transcript
would be stricken.

(T. 166)

From the record transmitted on

appeal, it does not appear that the reporter filed the required
affidavit and therefore, the entire testimony of Mrs. Husband,
based upon the reading of the transcript should be stricken
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and disregarded.
Defendant-appellant in her brief, at page 8, stated
that Mrs. Husbands summarized Mr. Slade's conduct as a
"dastardly thing to do to a child".

Mrs. Husbands was

requested to define what she meant by "dastardly".

In

response to the question, Mrs. Husbands stated the following:
"In my experience, dealing with children who are
made to be in conflict between the parents, there
is a constant fear of ~he loss of one parent because
of the love of the other. That is what I mean about
this being a very, very cruel thing to do to a child,
to place a child in that kind of conflict. A child
needs the love of both parents and when this is in
jeopardy, I think that the whole basis for self-esteem
and self-confidence and receiving what a child needs
is in jeopardy."
Mrs. Husbands' use of the term "dastardly" was not in reference
to the conduct of Mr. Slade.

The term used by her did not

summarize the conduct of Mr. Slade as claimed by the defendantappellant.

(T.

166-168)

Further clarification of the statement,

"This is a dastardly thing to do to a child", was made by
Mrs. Husbands at page 172 of the transcript in response to the
question of Mr. Schumacher.
"In the situation of divorce and a marriage, the
more typical one that you say you deal with, you
recognize that the father has a legal right to see the
children, and then you say, "This is a dastardly thing
to do to the child", there are legal rights and that is
the framework in which some people have to live."
A. Yes, maybe that is what I mean by being
dastardly.
Q. So you don't
itself, may be
A.

-- you feel that the law,

Places children in conflict.
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Q. And that is a necessary result very often
of that particular law?
A.

And unfortunately so, yes.

This situation of conflict was readily recognized by
Judge Winder during the course of the proceeding when he
stated:
"It isn't necessarily what I would like to do
anymore than I like to.have visitation by the father
after the divorce.
I think it is disruptive and I
think it is going to be very disruptive to have Mr. Slade
--somewhat disruptive to have him visit the child. But
I think that it is inherent in any divorce situation."
The Court in the Rozanski case (supra) was cognizant
of the fact that due to the strained relationship between the
parents, a conflict may arise that could be disruptive to
the child.

In recognizing this problem, the Court stated:

"Visitation rights of the putative father of
an illegitimate child in the mother's custody are
a matter for the supervision of the courts, and if
it appears after visitation privileges have been
granted, that the father's presence has an adverse
effect on the child's welfare, the right to visit
may be withdrawn."
Mrs. Husbands testified that this conflict was one between
the child's natural father and natural mother.
lines 17-19)

(T. 167 at

The evidence presented at trial indicated that

the conflict that existed, if any, was between the child's
natural father and Mr. Dennis, the husband of the natural
mother.

(T. 147)

Mrs. Husbands testified that the difficulty,

the confusion and the conflict that is predictable in visitati~
may eventually be overcome if there is a loving relationship
between the parents with whom the child spends most of his time.
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(T. 166)

The lower court, in rendering its decision, took into
consideration, all of the facts and circumstances presented by
the evidence, the respective memorandums of the parties submitted
to the Court, the testimony of Mrs. Husbands, and the report
of Dr. Goates.

(T. 183)

What weight is to be given to the

report of Dr. Goates, and the testimony of Mrs. Husbands lies
A

within the discretionary powers of the trial court.

Unless

it is made to appear that the trial court's decision granting
to plaintiff-respondent visitation rights with his legitimated
son consittutes

a clear abuse of discretion, and clearly

appears that such was not in the best interests of the child,
the decision of Judge Winder in this matter should not be
overturned.

Owen v. Owen, Utah

Merrill, Utah P.2d 1978.

P.2d, 1978; Merrill v.

A statutory parent-child relationship

was created between the plaintiff-respondent, and the publicly
acknowledged child, Corey Leon Slade, that places the child
in parity with the legitimate child in rights of support,
education and inheritance.

In the Matter of "M",

(supra), it

has always been recognized that the trial court has a large
measure of power in fixing custody of children and visitation
rights and, in the absence of showing of manifest abuse of
discretion, its decree will not be interfered with on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The finding of the trial court that the plaintiff,
Bryan L. Slade, legitimated the child, Corey Leon Slade, by
acknowledgement pursuant to 78-30-12, U.C.A.

(1953), including

the finding that plaintiff received Corey into his family and
treated him as a legitimate child, is clearly and
supported by facts

establish~d

be disturbed on appeal.

substantial~

1

by the evidence and should not

The defendant failed to sustain her

burden of proof that the granting of visitation rights to the
plaintiff by the trial court clearly constituted an abuse of ib

1

I

discretion and that the granting of such visitation rights wouN[
not be in the best interests of the minor child.

The judgment

of the trial court should be affirmed.

1

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
COTRO-MANES, WARR,
GREEN

I

FANKHAUSER~

-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE
Delivered three copies of the foregoing Brief of
Plaintiff-Respondent this

day of August, 1978, to

Judith Romney Wolbach.

-17Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

